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Facing the Unborn
Richard Stith

First Things

August-September 2015

An ultrasound video of an unborn child sucking its thumb makes a case against
abortion that reason hardly need supplement. But a zygote photographed just
after an in vitro conception is not so easily recognizable as a human being or
person. Pro-lifers often assume that this difficulty has been overcome by
modern science. Since the 1820s, when evidence of ovular fertilization first
became known, it has been clear that the life of a human being runs from
conception to death.
Scientific knowledge that each of our lives began with conception, however, is
insufficient to convince many people that an embryo is already one of us.
Michael Kinsley, writing in 2006 in the Washington Post, expressed his utter
bewilderment at opposition to embryonic stem cell research. “I cannot share, or
even fathom, [the anti-research] conviction that a microscopic dot—as oblivious
as a rock, more primitive than a worm—has the same human rights as anyone
reading this article. . . . Moral sincerity is not impressive if it depends on willful
ignorance and indifference to logic.”
Of course, Kinsley’s intuition that an embryo is “as oblivious as a rock” depends
on his own obliviousness to what he must know about the embryo’s inner
directedness and connection to its environment. To say that “embryos are
merely ‘clumps of cells,’” writes Jon Shields, “tends to obscure scientific truth
itself. This characterization suggests that an embryo is not biologically different
than what we might find under our fingernails if we were to gouge a bit of skin
from our arms. It is to imply erroneously that they lack coherence, integrity,
and self-direction as organisms.”

T

he science behind Shields’s riposte is unassailable. But more is going on

here than science. When a human embryo is visualized simply in terms of its

current appearance, its ongoing self-development can easily be missed. No
photograph can depict the inner self-direction of a growing embryo. Although
biological science tells us a different story, the embryo looks like nothing more
than an inert ball of cells. Its future development is hidden. This makes it seem
reasonable to suppose that an embryo is not human. Scientific knowledge of its
inner capability may not be enough to overcome this impression, for it is hard
to imagine a nature or design utterly hidden from view.
There is a still greater difficulty. With repeated observation and a touch of
scientific instruction, we can come to understand biological transformation. We
can recognize a caterpillar to be a developing butterfly. Even so, it seems nigh
impossible to think of a caterpillar as a particular or individual butterfly in the
process of development. But this is how we have to imagine embryos if we are to
do justice to their human development. We normally think of other creatures
generically, as just a certain type of insect, for example, but we think of humans
as specific individuals, albeit ones whose individuality may happen to be
unknown to us. Because the embryo in the photo cannot (except arbitrarily) be
ascribed any particular characteristics, it cannot easily be thought of as a
developing individual. To say “This embryo can grow up to be an adult human
being” is too abstract. We have all seen plain butterflies, but none of us has ever
seen a plain (that is to say, non-individuated) adult human.
As pro-lifers we must be honest with ourselves and admit that there are limits
to our ontological imagination, and that these limits are a barrier to full respect
for human life, especially very early in pregnancy when the unborn child does
not yet look much like the rest of us. However, there are ways to push back
these limits and expand our imaginative understanding.

A

lthough we have considerable difficulty recognizing future continuity of

being, we have little or no difficulty in seeing identity-despite-change when
looking back into the past. We may doubt that a new sprout, or a barren vine, is
really a tomato plant. But once it bears tomatoes, we know that it was always a

tomato plant. We may doubt that embryos are persons, but as we look back
upon ourselves or upon our neighbors, we realize that we and they were all once
embryos. An embryo in a photograph may at first seem no more than a grain of
sand, but if that embryo snapshot had been taken twenty years ago, just after
our friend Mary was conceived in vitro, we may well exclaim, “Look, Mary.
That’s you!”
Some abortion supporters have acknowledged, regretfully, our capacity to see
continuity of being and identity as we look back to the origins of each individual
life in the womb. Philosopher Jeffrey Reiman, a defender of abortion,
acknowledges that “we tend to read a kind of personal identity backwards into
fetuses, and personal identity carries connotations of moral identity beyond
mere physical identity.” Reiman adds, “Just because it is so natural to us to
think that way, I believe that this ‘retroactive empersonment’ is the single
greatest source of confusion in the abortion debate.”
Opponents of embryonic stem cell research (and early abortion) have also
drawn attention to the continuity of identity we understand in hindsight. A few
years ago, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops produced an ad
with a picture of a newborn baby and the caption, “270 days ago, Joshua was
just an embryo.” The text went on to emphasize, “Embryonic stem cells . . .
come with a heavy price tag: they are only obtained by destroying a living
human embryo. An embryo like Joshua, 270 days ago.” In 2010, Irish
opponents of embryo research put up billboards with photos of many stages of
life, from embryonic to elderly, and the words “YOU. ME. EVERYBODY. WE’RE ALL
JUST GROWN-UP EMBRYOS.”

These ad campaigns make a fundamentally cognitive appeal, not an emotional
one. They are attempts to wrap our minds more fully around human
development as known to modern science, helping us overcome our difficulty in
imagining that a very tiny organism can, with time, manifest itself as a mature
human being. The ads work (insofar as they do work) by encouraging us first to
look backward from fully developed human beings, where the continuity of

identity is personal and easy to see, and then very quickly to begin with
undeveloped embryos and think about how they are on a trajectory toward
showing themselves to be the kind of people we know and love.

I

f we could somehow visualize facets of a still undeveloped embryo’s own

future, our forward-looking intuition would become much more powerful. Here
Kwame Anthony Appiah has made a very useful suggestion. He thinks
Americans debating abortion should consider that “those dead fetuses could
have been . . . their children’s friends.” Every friend is a unique individual. To
see an embryo as a possible friend is thus to envision it as a human individual,
even though nothing individual is yet known about him or her.
How much more transformative it could be if we could analyze an embryo’s
genetic structure and conclude, “This embryo will grow up to be a petite Asian
woman with considerable artistic talent.” Or better: Suppose a computer could
someday produce images from her DNA and show us her likeness—even her
very face—as a newborn infant, a little girl, a teenager, or an adult. Such an
advance in technology might be as important as ultrasound for the pro-life
movement, turning public opinion against the destruction of embryonic human
beings. Real-time ultrasound images of fetal faces have already brought about
more respect for prenatal life; how much greater might be the effect of faces
with open eyes. Could we easily “look an embryo in the eyes” and decide to
annihilate her?

T

his is not science fiction. The technological possibility of such images

appears to be upon us. Forensic investigators are already using “DNA
phenotyping” as a supplement to artists’ sketches in developing rough visual
profiles of suspects, especially where no one has witnessed a crime but traces of
unexpected DNA have been left behind. A recent story in the New York
Timesabout the use of this technology contained examples of computergenerated faces paired with their actual counterparts. The resemblances may

not be perfect, but they’re striking. Researchers are seeking to improve the
accuracy of DNA-based visual profiles by adding ever more genetic variables.
If adult DNA can lead to a sketch of that person’s face, surely gestational DNA
(obtained in a non-injurious way—from the placenta, for example) could be
used to sketch the future face of an unborn child, for the content of the DNA in
our cells changes but little during our lifetimes. We are, perhaps, on the brink of
a new advance in the pro-life consensus, one not unlike that brought about by
the now widespread use of ultrasound technology.
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